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Public health surveillance is essential for detecting and 
responding to infectious diseases and necessary for compli-
ance with the revised International Health Regulations (IHR) 
2005. To assess reporting capacities and compliance with 
IHR of all 50 states and Washington, DC, we sent a ques-
tionnaire to respective epidemiologists; 47 of 51 responded. 
Overall reporting capacity was high. Eighty-one percent of 
respondents reported being able to transmit notiﬁ  cations 
about unknown or unexpected events to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) daily. Additionally, 
80% of respondents reported use of a risk assessment tool 
to determine whether CDC should be notiﬁ  ed of possible 
public health emergencies. These ﬁ   ndings suggest that 
most states have systems in place to ensure compliance 
with IHR. However, full state-level compliance will require 
additional efforts.
T
he 2005 revisions to the International Health Regula-
tions (IHR 2005) were a major global policy achieve-
ment to ensure international recognition and notiﬁ  cation 
of unusual public health events. These regulations are an 
international legal instrument that binds 194 countries 
(World Health Organization [WHO] member states). The 
goal of IHR 2005 is to help the international community 
prevent or respond to acute public health risks that have 
the potential to cross borders and threaten the global pop-
ulation. As seen with the emergence of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, diseases have the potential to spread quickly around 
the globe through international travel and trade (1). Mem-
ber states are required to report certain diseases and pub-
lic health events to WHO. Furthermore, the rights and 
obligations of member states are deﬁ  ned to establish pro-
cedures that WHO must follow to uphold global public 
health security (2).
The 2005 revision was the ﬁ  rst major update to the 
IHR since 1969 and was designed to reﬂ  ect trends in dis-
ease emergence and spread over the past several decades. 
The 2005 revision also was meant to unify the consid-
erable changes in communication capacity, disease sur-
veillance, and investigation infrastructure. Member states 
must report potential public health emergencies of inter-
national concern (PHEIC), including those of biologic, 
chemical, radionuclear, or unknown origin, to WHO. A 
common decision matrix that focuses national reporting 
around a risk assessment process is used rather than sole 
reliance on reporting of speciﬁ  c diseases or incidents (3). 
This method of reporting requires all member states to de-
velop, strengthen, and maintain a core set of public health 
surveillance and response capacities at the local, interme-
diate, and national levels (4).
After IHR revision in 2005, member states were pro-
vided a 2-year window in which to assess their surveillance 
and response capacities, focusing on 4 necessary character-
istics of surveillance systems: timeliness, sensitivity, sta-
bility, and usefulness (3). Each of the 194 member states 
also was required to designate a National Focal Point that 
would assess any event within 48 hours. After the assess-
ment speciﬁ  ed in Appendix 2 of IHR 2005, each member 
state must notify WHO of any potential PHEIC. Therefore, 
core public health surveillance systems at local and nation-
al levels must be capable of ensuring national awareness of 
incidents in a timely manner.
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Surveillance systems exist at many levels: clinics; 
hospitals; and local, state, national, regional, and global 
levels. To be effective, these different levels must be well 
integrated. Literature on surveillance systems often exam-
ines each level separately or, at most, the links between 
2 adjacent levels, describing the importance of integrat-
ing each system so that communication between levels is 
more effective (3,5–7). State-to-national notiﬁ  cation is a 
key aspect of federalist systems and has been viewed as a 
key challenge for countries with this type of government 
structure (3); several authors have noted the political and 
practical difﬁ  culties these surveillance systems may face 
and the various ways national disease surveillance can be 
facilitated (8).
In the United States, reporting of nationally notiﬁ  able 
diseases to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) by states is voluntary. Public health surveillance 
takes place within a state on the basis of reports received 
from a variety of sources, typically local. Reporting is man-
dated by state legislation or regulation. States then deter-
mine whether CDC should be notiﬁ  ed. Notiﬁ  cations from 
states, territories, and the District of Columbia are collected 
and analyzed by the National Notiﬁ  able Diseases Surveil-
lance System. A 2004 review of this system showed that 
for meningococcal disease laboratory results, local enti-
ties reported to their states and then states notiﬁ  ed NNDSS 
within 2–117 days (5). More recently, 60% of meningococ-
cal diagnosis reports were received by states within 1 day 
after diagnosis (9).
The literature identiﬁ  es essential elements that surveil-
lance systems need to meet IHR 2005 criteria, including 
electronic information systems and supportive infrastruc-
ture, to ensure timely reporting to the National Focal Point 
(6,7). In addition, intergovernment cooperation with both 
formal and informal communication, from the local to the 
international level, are essential aspects of successfully 
functioning public health surveillance systems (3,6,8) and 
can ensure rapid reporting of incidents before laboratory 
conﬁ  rmation is received (3,6). Overall, key aspects of suc-
cessful surveillance systems identiﬁ  ed in the literature align 
closely with the requirements of IHR 2005. This alignment 
suggests that systems built in accordance with the agree-
ment will provide successful global coverage.
 Since the new regulations took effect, no studies 
have been done to determine the timeliness of reporting 
conditions speciﬁ  ed in IHR 2005. In addition, no reports 
exist that discuss timeliness of notiﬁ  cation to CDC about 
unusual cases or outbreaks of unknown cause. To address 
these gaps and to determine the ability of states to com-
ply with IHR 2005, we assessed state surveillance capaci-
ties through surveys completed by the Council of State 
and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). This assessment 
examined several key requirements that are necessary to 
effectively meet national responsibilities and ensure com-
pliance with IHR 2005.
Methods
In February 2009, CSTE electronically distributed a 
structured, self-administered questionnaire to state epide-
miologists in all 50 states and Washington, DC. Responses 
were made anonymous at the time of data analysis. The 
questionnaire was designed to address the following ques-
tions: 1) How are states able to determine the status of po-
tential public health emergencies? 2) Are local health de-
partments able to report in a timely manner to the correct 
point-of-contact (POC) in their state? 3) Are states able to 
notify CDC of public health emergencies in a timely man-
ner (i.e., within 24 hours)? 4) Do states support or imple-
ment other control measures (i.e., collaboration with other 
departments or cross-jurisdiction)? Frequencies and per-
centages were used to describe the results.
The CSTE State Reportable Conditions Assessment, 
completed by state epidemiologists, also was used to assess 
state reporting practices. Information was obtained from 
the 2007 Assessment, which is available for review by all 
states and territories (10).
Results
A total of 47 (92%) of the 51 eligible jurisdictions re-
sponded to the questionnaire. Eighty percent of respondents 
reported the use of risk assessments to determine the neces-
sity of notifying CDC about unusual or unexpected events 
(Figure 1). Of those who used risk assessments, ≈50% used 
them to initiate formal investigations. About 50% of respon-
dents reported the use of risk assessments to evaluate wheth-
er notiﬁ  cation to the state health ofﬁ  cer (51%), chief emer-
gency response/management ofﬁ  ce (47%), and CDC or other 
federal entities (51%), respectively, was necessary. Twenty-
eight percent reported use of a state-based algorithm; 25% 
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Figure 1. Proportion of state epidemiologists who use risk 
assessments to determine whether notiﬁ   cation to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention is necessary, showing types 
of algorithms used, United States, 2009. WHO, World Health 
Organization.RESEARCH
reported use of the WHO algorithm for risk assessments. 
The remainder of respondents used another algorithm (ex-
cluding a state-based algorithm or the WHO algorithm) or 
were not sure of the algorithm used in their state.
More than 90% of jurisdictions required reports of sus-
pected and probable cases of the 4 immediately notiﬁ  able 
IHR 2005 conditions (i.e., smallpox, poliomyelitis caused 
by wild-type poliovirus, human inﬂ  uenza caused by a new 
subtype, and severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS]) 
within 24 hours after diagnosis (Table 1). In addition, 96% 
of states reported that they would notify CDC of suspected 
and probable cases of IHR 2005 conditions within 24 hours 
(Table 1). Eighty-one percent of respondents reported hav-
ing the capacity to transmit daily notiﬁ  cations to CDC. Of 
those unable to transmit daily notiﬁ  cations, 5 indicated that 
they would be able to provide daily electronic data to CDC 
within <1 year 
All respondents reported they would either always or 
sometimes notify CDC of an unusual or unexpected case 
or outbreak; 60% reported they would always notify CDC 
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Table 1. Reported circumstances and time frames for reporting and notification of International Health Regulations conditions by state 




Within 4 h, no. 
(%) 
Same business 
day, no. (%) 
Within 24 h, 
no. (%)  Total no. 
Novel influenza virus 
  Time frame for reporting 
    Suspected  23 (52)  2 (5)  1 (2)  5 (11)  37
  Probable  1  (2)  0 0 1  (2)  4
  Total†  25 2 1 6 44
  Time frame for notification 
    Suspected  16 (36)  9 (20)  3 (7)  1 (2)  29
    Probable  9 (20)  0 3 (7)  1 (2)  14
  Confirmed  0 0 1  (2)  0 1
  Total†  26 9 7 2 45
Severe acute respiratory syndrome 
  Time frame for reporting 
    Suspected  25 (56)  1 (2)  4 (9)  8 (18)  41
  Probable  1  (2)  1  (2)  0 0 2
  Confirmed  0 0 0 1  (2)  1
  Total†  27 2 4 9 45
  Time frame for notification 
    Suspected  16 (36)  9 (20)  4 (9)  2 (4)  32
    Probable  8 (18)  1 (2)  3 (7)  0 12
  Confirmed  1  (2)  0 0 0 1
  Total†  25 10 7 2 45
Smallpox
  Time frame for reporting 
    Suspected  30 (67)  2 (4)  1 (2)  6 (13)  41
  Probable  0 1  (2)  0 0 2
  Confirmed  0 0 0 1  (2)  1
  Total†  31 3 1 7 45
  Time frame for notification 
    Suspected  23 (51)  5 (11)  4 (9)  1 (2)  33
  Probable  8  (18)  2  (4)  0 0 11
  Total†  32 7 4 1 45
Poliomyelitis, wild type 
  Time frame for reporting 
    Suspected  22 (49)  1 (2)  1 (2)  9 (20)  37
  Probable  2  (4)  2  (4)  0 0 4
  Confirmed  0 0 0 1  (2)  3
  Total†  25 3 1 10 45
  Time frame for notification 
    Suspected  11 (24)  9 (20)  5 (11)  1 (2)  27
    Probable  8 (18)  1 (2)  3 (7)  2 (4)  14
  Confirmed  1  (2)  0 0 1  (2)  3
  Total†  21 10 8 4 45
*n = 45 for all percentages except time frame for reporting of novel influenza virus (n = 44).  
†Includes states that did not have a specified time for reporting and/or notification or they were not sure of the time frame for reporting and/or notification.Publlic Health Surveillance, USA
within 24 hours (Figure 2). Among the respondents, 30% 
would sometimes notify CDC within 24 hours. According 
to the 2007 State Reportable Conditions Assessment, 48 of 
the jurisdictions included unusual or unexpected events on 
their reportable conditions lists.
Furthermore, most states could identify a speciﬁ  c POC 
in their state for reporting various public health events and 
emergencies (Figure 3). Ninety-one percent of states re-
ported having a designated POC for zoonotic, foodborne, 
and infectious events; for chemical and radiologic events, 
84% and 86% of states, respectively, reported having a des-
ignated POC.
More than 50% of respondents reported having formal 
information-sharing systems or mechanisms pertaining 
to emergencies or outbreaks with state law enforcement, 
emergency management and homeland security, agricul-
ture, environmental protection, and ﬁ  sh and wildlife agen-
cies, excluding the state departments of transportation 
(37%) (Table 2). Fifty-one percent reported participating 
in cross-jurisdiction electronic surveillance and having re-
porting systems for foodborne and infectious diseases with 
neighboring states.
Discussion
Most states can successfully conduct public health 
surveillance in compliance with IHR 2005. However, full 
state-level capacity for compliance was not found on any 
assessment response. Additional efforts are needed to en-
sure the ability of the United States to meet its IHR 2005 
obligations.
Most states reported use of risk assessments to deter-
mine the need to notify CDC about unusual or unexpected 
events. In addition, ≈50% of states reported the use of risk 
assessment when initiating a formal investigation. IHR 
2005 emphasizes the use of risk assessments to notify 
WHO about public health emergencies, rather than about 
speciﬁ  c events. The use of risk assessments in notifying 
CDC can help determine whether notiﬁ  cation is necessary 
and ensure timely notiﬁ  cation without waiting for labora-
tory conﬁ  rmation.
Most (>80%) states reported having 1 POC for re-
porting chemical, radiologic, foodborne, infectious, and 
zoonotic events. All states should have a POC to facilitate 
prompt assessment and appropriate reporting. Such con-
tacts also can assist in assessing events outside their areas 
of expertise or with unknown cause.
Reports of capacity to transmit daily notiﬁ  cations to 
CDC suggest that data collection and transmission capacity 
has improved substantially in recent years. The ability to 
transmit reports to CDC is a critical function, which allows 
for national situational awareness in high-proﬁ  le events 
and public health emergencies.
Not all respondents included unusual or unexpected 
events on their state’s reportable conditions lists. Adding 
this criterion would help ensure that conditions having the 
potential to become public health emergencies can be rec-
ognized and reported in a timely manner.
Internal and external relationships of each state can 
play a role in reporting. Most states have formal informa-
tion-sharing systems with other agencies within their state. 
Such dissemination of information within a state increases 
the likelihood that IHR reportable events are appropriately 
evaluated and reported. Other agencies may have knowl-
edge that could be incorporated into a risk assessment.
About 50% of respondents reported participation in 
cross-jurisdictional electronic surveillance and having re-
porting systems for foodborne and infectious diseases. 
Public health surveillance across state jurisdictions is as 
important as the sharing of information within a state. 
Neighboring states can be alerted to public health emer-
gencies that have the potential to become widespread or 
even global.
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Figure 2. Number of states that notify the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention of an unusual or unexpected case or 
outbreak of disease, by time frame, United States, 2009.
Figure 3. Number of state epidemiologists who have points-of-
contact within the state for reporting different types of potential 
public health emergencies of international concern, United States, 
2009.RESEARCH
Our assessment has several limitations. First, only 
states were assessed; neither territories nor local health 
departments were included. Circumstances are sufﬁ  ciently 
different in the territories; no conclusions about their capac-
ity should be drawn because they are likely to have differ-
ent reporting practices and capacities. Future assessments 
should focus on identifying and documenting capacities for 
IHR 2005 compliance in at least a sample of jurisdictions 
at the local or county level. Second, our assessment relied 
on self-reporting, which in some instances may have led to 
inaccuracies or bias. Data were made anonymous before 
analysis so that states would not be singled out as having 
suboptimal reporting practices or capacities. Therefore, we 
could not inquire about potential discrepancies.
 To enable the United States to fully meet its IHR 2005 
obligations, all states should include unusual or unexpected 
events or outbreaks on their state lists of reportable condi-
tions. In addition, states and CDC should work toward fur-
ther development of the nationally notiﬁ  able conditions list 
and the timeframes for reporting. The capacity to transmit 
records to CDC on a daily basis is key to full compliance 
with IHR 2005. Risk assessments of unusual or unexpected 
events should be performed to determine whether they meet 
requirements for notiﬁ  cation to CDC as a potential PHEIC. 
Performing such risk assessments will enable timely no-
tiﬁ   cation to CDC, even before laboratory conﬁ  rmation. 
Furthermore, state POCs are likely to facilitate recognition 
and reporting of potential public health emergencies within 
their respective states.
State health departments should work to ensure that 
their counterparts in state government and in local health 
departments understand the requirements of IHR 2005; re-
porting exercises may help accomplish this goal. All health 
ofﬁ  cials, particularly those at the state level, should have 
a basic understanding of these international regulations, 
especially the reporting and notiﬁ  cation timeframes and 
practices. Reporting exercises would give state and local 
health ofﬁ  cials the ability to assess potential public health 
emergencies in a practice environment and allow a broader 
perspective of when notiﬁ  cation is necessary.
Expansion of cross-jurisdictional surveillance and re-
porting systems also would beneﬁ  t national recognition and 
investigation of public health emergencies, especially for 
foodborne illness and infectious diseases. Such systems are 
not explicitly required by IHR 2005 but would assist states 
in the assessment and timely reporting of public health 
emergencies, both of which are necessary for compliance. 
National, state, and local government agencies should as-
sist states in implementing these practices and developing 
appropriate infrastructures. 
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Table 2. Proportion of state agencies that have formal 
information-sharing systems or mechanism for emergencies or 
outbreaks within state government, USA, 2009 
Government agency  No./total reporting (%) 
State law enforcement  33/44 (75) 
Emergency management and/or 
homeland security 
37/44 (84) 
Agriculture 35/45 (78) 
Transportation 17/44 (37) 
Environmental protection  30/44 (68) 
Fish and wildlife   28/45 (62) 